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Can	Sri	Lanka	capitalise	out	of	its	strategic	location	in
the	Indian	Ocean	region?
Today	there	is	growing	importance	of	oceans	for	trade	and	commerce.	While	acknowledging	the
strategic	position	of	the	island	in	the	Indian	Ocean	Region,	small	states	such	as	Sri	Lanka	have	to	be
aware	of	the	geopolitical	implications	resulting	in	complications	that	require	foreign	policy	adjustments,
writes	Natasha	Fernando.	
Today	there	is	growing	importance	of	oceans	for	trade	and	commerce.	The	Indian	Ocean	is	the	world’s
third-largest	body	of	water	with	50%	of	trade	traversing	the	region	covering	approximately	20%	of	the	water	on	the
Earth’s	surface.	Due	to	existence	of	power	rivalries	and	wars,	the	oceans	are	now	prone	to	conflict.	Some	examples
are:	the	conflict	over	Suez	Canal,	Strait	of	Hormuz,	Pirate	and	terrorist	activity,	South	China	Sea	disputes	etc.	Sri
Lanka,	a	small	island	state	is	strategically	located	among	the	most	important	sea	lanes	of	communication.	The	US
Senate’s	Foreign	Relations	Committee	on	Sri	Lanka	states	that	“Sri	Lanka’s	strategic	importance	to	the	United
States,	China	and	India	is	viewed	by	some	as	a	key	piece	in	a	larger	geopolitical	dynamic”.	As	a	country	that
emerged	from	a	civil	war	facing	human	rights	allegations;	the	domestic	politics	and	international	relations	are	heavily
geopolitical	with	foreign	powers	having	vested	interests.
Strategic	ports,	geopolitics	and	rivalry	in	the	Indian	Ocean
Sri	Lanka’s	location	in	the	Indian	Ocean	region	as	an	island	State	has	been	of	strategic	geopolitical	relevance	to
several	major	powers.	Sri	Lanka	was	colonised	by	Portuguese,	Dutch	and	the	British	to	be	used	as	a	transit	hub	for
trading	goods.	These	powers	also	used	Sri	Lankan	ports	for	docking	and	refuelling	their	ships	which	were	navigating
their	vast	empires.	Some	examples	that	highlight	Western	interests	in	Sri	Lanka’s	strategic	location	are	the	British
Defence	and	External	affairs	Agreement	of	1948,	and	the	Maritime	Agreement	with	USSR	of	1962	during	the	Sirimao
Bandaranike	administration.	Even	during	the	J.R	Jayewardene	(1978-1989)	and	Ranasinghe	Premadasa	(1989-
1993)	tenures,	Sri	Lanka	was	chosen	to	build	the	Voice	of	America	transmitting	station	[suspected	of	being	used	for
intelligence	gathering	purposes	and	electronic	surveillance	of	the	Indian	Ocean].
It	was	the	massive	Chinese	involvement	during	the	Rajapaksa	tenure	that	garnered	the	deepest	controversies.
“China	is	building	state	of	the	art	gigantic	modern	ports	all	along	the	Indian	Ocean	to	the	south	of	it,	in	Gwadar,	in
Pakistan,	in	Chittagong,	in	Bangladesh,	in	Kyauk	Phru,	in	Burma,	in	Hambantota,	in	Sri	Lanka”	According	to	Robert
Kaplan,	author	of	‘Asia’s	Caldron’	:	China’s	string	of	pearl’s	strategy	is	aimed	at	encircling	India	to	establish
dominance	in	the	Indian	Ocean.	Post	2015,	Sri	Lanka	still	relies	heavily	on	China	for	Port	city	project	and	for
continuation	of	Chinese	funded	infrastructure	projects	in	Sri	Lanka.	Although	the	Hambantota	harbour	is	reportedly
making	losses,	it	too	has	potential	for	development	due	to	its	strategic	location.	According	to	Colin	Chapman
(Broadcaster)	:	“The	deep-sea	port,	constructed	and	largely	financed	by	the	Chinese	at	a	cost	of	$1.5	billion,
straddles	a	major	eastward	shipping	route	used	by	200	to	300	international	vessels	daily”
Sri	Lanka	has	a	list	of	highly	strategic	ports	located	among	busiest	sea	lanes	of	communication.	The	Lloyds	list	state
Sri	Lanka’s	Colombo	Port	is	the	25th	busiest	container	port	in	the	world.	The	Sri	Lanka	Ports	Authority	reports,	it
made	profits	of	11	billion	rupees	in	2016	while	recording	revenue	of	44	billion	rupees.	The	natural	deep	water	harbor
at	Trincomalee	is	the	fifth	largest	natural	harbour	in	the	world.	Nissanka	states	port	city	of	Trincomalee	was	the	main
base	for	Eastern	Fleet	and	British	Royal	Navy	during	the	Second	World	War.	Sri	Lanka’s	location	can	thus	serve
both	commercial	and	industrial	purposes	and	be	used	as	a	military	base.
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A	container	ship	at	Hambantota	port.	Photo	credit:	Deneth17,	Wikimedia	Commons,	CC	BY-SA	3.0.	
Balancing	interests	and	external	pressures	Kaplan	in	“Asia’s	Cauldron”	opines	that	Indian	Ocean	region	is	‘geared	to
be	the	century’s	most	intense	point	of	conflict’.	This	exerts	pressure	on	Sri	Lanka,	a	small	state	to	either	accede	to
external	demands,	or	stay	neutral.	Therefore	Sri	Lanka	will	face	challenges	in	maintaining	her	sovereignty	and	also
foreign	policy	of	non-alignment.	It	is	generally	argued	that	the	policy	of	non-alignment	was	compromised	during	the
Rajapaksa	administration	which	leaned	heavily	on	China	for	economic	and	diplomatic	support.	Senaratne	suggests
learning	to	capitalise	from	balancing	the	interests	of	the	most	important	regional	and	extra-regional	powers	[China,
India,	and	USA]	could	harness	Sri	Lanka’s	potential.	Notwithstanding,	the	seas	are	highly	important	for	the
development	of	Island	states	such	as	Sri	Lanka	to	participate	in	global	trade	of	goods	and	commercial	activity.
It	has	been	argued	by	scholars	that	acceding	to	foreign	demands	can	change	international	voting	behaviour	in	favour
of	Sri	Lanka	in	which	case	balancing	geopolitical	interests	should	be	at	the	centre	of	Sri	Lanka’s	foreign	policy
strategy.	Nissanka	has	pointed	out	during	the	Premadasa	tenure,	following	peak	of	LTTE	terrorist	activity	and	JVP
insurrections;	allowing	voice	of	America	to	continue	its	operations	in	Sri	Lanka	lessoned	international	pressures.
China	and	Russia	have	been	constant	Sri	Lankan	allies	who	had	expressed	willingness	to	veto	any	UN-sponsored
resolution	probing	into	international	intervention	into	Sri	Lanka’s	Human	Rights	issue.	Sri	Lankan	government	has
been	constantly	evading	foreign	direct	intervention	to	Sri	Lankan	civil	war	especially	during	final	stages	of	the	war	on
grounds	of	sovereignty.	It	has	been	argued	that	China	(a	veto	power)	was	a	necessity	to	evade	human	rights
allegations	and	Chinese	involvement	was	warmly	accommodated	by	the	government.	Today	China’s	involvement
cannot	easily	be	diluted;	China	subtly	displays	aggression	towards	other	extra	territorial	power	gaining	more
diplomatic	footprint	in	Sri	Lanka.	One	such	example	was	the	docking	of	Chinese	warship	in	Colombo	port	in	2014
during	the	visit	of	Japanese	Prime	minister	Shinzo	Abe.	There	is	also	Chinese-Indian	rivalry	to	gain	diplomatic
footprint	post	2015	evident	by	increased	Indian-Sri	Lankan	concurrences.
Conclusion
While	acknowledging	the	strategic	position	of	the	island	in	the	Indian	Ocean	Region,	small	states	such	as	Sri	Lanka
have	to	be	aware	of	the	geopolitical	implications	resulting	in	complications	that	require	foreign	policy	adjustments.
One	such	adjustment	is	to	neutralise	China	by	increasing	diplomatic	gain	from	Japan,	USA	and	India.	Although	non-
alignment	proved	useful	during	the	Cold	War	period,	and	remains	relevant	today,	Sri	Lanka	cannot	follow	this	policy
to	precision.	Amidst	international	probes	into	human	rights	allegations;	it	is	important	uphold	the	country’s
sovereignty	and	territorial	integrity.	This	could	be	done	through	effective	public	diplomacy,	more	track	one	diplomatic
engagements	with	other	Asian	counterparts	and	playing	a	better	role	in	regional	organisations	could	harness	Sri
Lanka’s	potential.	Perhaps	someday	Sri	Lanka	could	aspire	to	be	a	neutral	venue	catering	to	high	level	diplomatic
engagement	as	was	the	recent	case	of	the	Trump-Kim	summit	held	in	Singapore.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics	or	the	stance	of		INSSSL	or	the	government	of	Sri	Lanka.	Please	read	our	comments
policy	before	posting.
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